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When second-best is still a no-brainer: Why Labour should shoot for a 
majority coalition in May 2015 
Ben Yong and Tim Bale 
 
It says a lot about the uncertainty that currently surrounds the next general election 
that there is one thing that everyone seems sure of, namely that it will not produce a 
comfortable Commons majority for either Labour or the Conservatives.  The Tories, 
having effectively abandoned the ‘vote blue, go green’, ‘compassionate conservative’, 
‘modernisation’ agenda pursued by David Cameron when he first became leader, will 
find it difficult to do much, if any better, than they did in 2010.  Labour can hardly do 
worse, yet it looks unlikely – given widespread doubts about its economic 
competence and its leader, and given the threat it faces from the SNP (not to mention 
UKIP and the Greens) – to emerge as anything more than the largest party in a post-
election parliament.  The fact that the UK’s first past the post electoral system 
currently does it far more favours than its opponents looks unlikely to alter than 
reality. 
 
This will leave Labour with a number of possible options.  It may be able to form a 
minority government, either on its own or in coalition with one or more partners.  If 
this happens, it will either have to pass legislation on an issue-by-issue, vote-by-vote 
basis or else agree ‘confidence and supply’ agreements with one or more smaller 
parties.  Under such agreements, one or more partners would remain outside 
government but agree to support a minority government on issues involving votes of 
confidence and the budget. Confidence and supply agreements should, while they 
last, ensure that a Labour (or Labour-led) minority administration can get most of 
what it wants through the Commons and that it will not be in daily danger of collapse.  
Alternatively, if the numbers add up, Labour may be able to form a majority coalition 
together with one or more partners, with the most obvious names in the frame being 
the Lib Dems (depending perhaps on who the leader of the Lib Dems is) and possibly 
the SNP but not forgetting (presuming they are there and presuming they insist on 
joining, rather than simply supporting, a Labour-led government) the Greens, Plaid 
Cymru, and one or more of the Northern Irish parties. 
 
Minority government 
 
The first of these options – minority government – is much misunderstood.  For one 
thing, it seems to go against the logic of the UK’s traditionally majoritarian, winner-
takes-all political system: how can a government which does not control more than 
half of the seats in the Commons hope to function and to survive?  For another, there 
is a widespread but arguably mistaken assumption that this is an option that is 
somehow automatically open to the leader of the largest party in the Commons, 
especially perhaps if that leader is the sitting prime minister.  In fact, the ability to 
form a minority government depends crucially upon the willingness of other parties 
to refrain from voting against it on the Queen’s Speech or (and there is room for 
debate on this) on an explicit confidence motion.1  There is no guarantee that a 
putative (or an actual) prime minister who is unable to convince the Palace (for 
which read those who advise the monarch) that he or she has obtained reassurances 
to that effect will be given the Queen’s commission to form said government in the 
first place – not, anyway, if another party leader can make a more convincing case 
(perhaps backed by written or verbal promises from smaller parties) that he or she 
can put together a combination that a) is willing and able to defeat the largest party 
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on a confidence vote and b) vote confidence in an alternative government that he or 
she would lead.  In other words, just because Stanley Baldwin was allowed in 1923 to 
face the House of Commons and then resign after losing a vote on the Queen’s 
Speech does not mean that David Cameron will automatically be allowed to do so in 
2015 – unless perhaps the Palace thinks this is the best way to somehow ‘keep the 
Queen out of politics’. 
 
Of course, it could well be that smaller parties do promise not to bring a government-
in-the-making down, perhaps because they are worried that they may not have the 
funds to fight another election or that they will be punished by the electorate for 
triggering one by refusing to provide support. But they have to balance those 
concerns with the fear of a backlash for propping up an administration led by a party 
that, by definition, very few voters voted for and whose policy prescriptions may run 
totally counter to their own.  Little wonder, then, that there is an increasing tendency 
for them to them to insist on ‘getting it in writing’ – in other words to negotiate the 
kind of formal ‘confidence and supply’ agreement that characterises what political 
scientists have termed ‘contract parliamentarianism’.2 
 
Presuming, for the sake of argument, then, that Ed Miliband can persuade one or 
more smaller parties to allow him to form a minority government, either with or 
without strings attached, then this may admittedly be an option worth his (and our) 
consideration.  Whether it would go the distance in the sense of lasting a full 
parliamentary term, however, is open to doubt.  We have long known that minority 
governments tend to be shorter-lived than their majority equivalents, even if in those 
polities with more experience of them they last much longer than many unfamiliar 
with them might imagine.3  The UK, of course, is not one of those polities, although it 
may have much to learn from overseas about making minority government work.4  
Scandinavia, and in particular Denmark, is probably the premier exemplar, but so 
too is Spain.  Anyone who thinks that there is something strange or unworkable 
about regionalist, even potentially separatist parties, keeping a state-wide minority 
government in power should remember both the centre-right and centre-left in Spain 
has at times relied on the Catalans to win and maintain power in Madrid. 
 
Inasmuch as it has one, the UK’s own history of minority government is far from 
inspiring.  In the twentieth century, Labour governed as a minority in three cases.  
The first was from January to November 1924, when it was brought down, amidst a 
Red Scare, by its Conservative and Liberal opponents.  The second was from May 
1929 to August 1931, when it collapsed after the bulk of the Cabinet refused to agree 
spending cuts pressed upon it by a Labour Prime Minister and Chancellor who 
promptly, jumped ship to a National Government dominated by the Conservatives.  
The third experiment with minority government began in 1977, after Labour lost the 
tiny majority it had won in the second general election of 1974. Prime Minister then 
James Callaghan negotiated the so-called ‘Lib-Lab’ pact which sustained a minority 
Labour government between March 1997 and September 1978.  After the Liberals 
withdrew from the pact, Labour carried on alone until it was defeated in March 1979 
by a motion of no-confidence laid down by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party, 
which went on to win a comfortable majority in May of that year.  The Conservative 
administration led by John Major was a minority government between December 
1996 (when it finally lost the overall majority it had won back in 1992) and May 1997, 
at which point it was defeated in New Labour’s landslide win. 
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Given the above, the argument that minority government would present the ideal 
opportunity for Ed Miliband to prove himself Prime Ministerial for a few months or 
even years before going back to the electorate for a full mandate maybe a little less 
persuasive than it first appears.  It largely premised, anyway, on what Harold Wilson 
did some fifty years ago when, after winning a narrow majority in 1964 he held on to 
it before going to the country again in 1966 and winning a landslide.  But, even if we 
forget for the moment that the 1964-66 administration was not a minority 
government, there are some important differences. 
 
First, Wilson was already relatively highly-rated as a leader: Miliband, for all his 
qualities, is not and won’t necessarily become prime ministerial by becoming Prime 
Minister.  Secondly, the public finances were in nothing like the dire state that they 
are in now.  Thirdly, inasmuch as the economy was in trouble (and, since sterling was 
both fixed against the dollar and badly overvalued, it wasn’t actually too robust), 
Wilson, coming in after thirteen years of Tory rule, could reasonably blame the 
previous government for his problems: Miliband, given Labour was in power for the 
same period until not too long ago, doesn’t have that luxury.  Fourthly, Wilson faced, 
in turn, one Conservative opponent, Alec Home, who had clearly had his day, and 
another, Ted Heath, whom voters found distinctly underwhelming.   Who knows who 
a putative Prime Minister Miliband will be squaring up to? Fifthly, while Wilson was 
free to call an election at the moment of his choosing, Miliband (unless he somehow 
manages to repeal it early on) will have to operate under the Fixed Term Parliament 
Act: this does not mean he will be utterly unable to engineer an early dissolution, but 
it will not be completely within his power.  Finally, the constitutional difficulties are 
not the only ones that will weigh heavily on a putative Prime Minister Miliband – so, 
too, will Labour’s financial difficulties.  These have eased a little after a few years of 
good housekeeping and Short money.  But the latter will have dried up if the party 
has made it into government and the Tories are generally thought to have amassed a 
much bigger war chest in preparation for a swift second election, albeit one which 
they hope they, and not Labour, will be in position to call. 
 
The Lib Dems – and the rest 
  
None of the above, one suspects, will do much to quieten those, particularly on the 
trade union left of the party – stand up Len McCluskey – who have made it clear that 
they would prefer a Miliband minority rather than a deal with Lib Dem politicians.  
In their view (and it is not an unreasonable one) Clegg and co. have essentially rolled 
over and let the Tories do pretty much what they like to public spending and public 
services since 2010.  So why should they be given a second chance – particularly 
when some of them (the Orange Bookers at least) will make it their mission to bind 
Labour to another five years of austerity, the abandonment of which is precisely what 
the Labour left will demand?  If Labour refuses to invite the Lib Dems to join them in 
coalition and they therefore vote down a Labour minority government (or else 
prevent it from forming in the first place), then, the argument runs, it will finally 
prove to any voters who haven’t already twigged that they are Tory stooges.  Besides, 
the Lib Dem brand is already so toxic that Labour should have nothing to do with it 
lest it find itself contaminated – an argument that has traction not just with the 
Labour left but also the Labour right.  Indeed, one suspects that Andrew Adonis is 
not the only Blairite to have had his or her eyes opened both by the behaviour of the 
Lib Dems during the famous ‘five days in May’ 2010 and by their conduct ever since.5  
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It could be, of course, that the Lib Dems do so badly in the General Election that they 
decide that they are best off out of government and prefer not to join a coalition.  
Opposition, some might argue, will give them a chance to rest, re-group and re-tool.  
It might even give the electorate time to forget, meaning they might one day be able 
to wrest back the mantle of the ‘none-of-the-above’ party that UKIP (and the Greens) 
snatched away from them after 2010.  If so, they would be doing something that few 
other parties are prepared to do.  Even radical left parties, whose participation in 
power is particularly and predictably fraught with difficulties, normally grab the 
chance with both hands when it is offered to them: who knows, after all, when it 
might come round again?6  One might also argue that showing they are willing to 
work with Labour as well as the Conservatives is actually integral to the Lib Dems’ 
image in the long-term.  After all, if they turn down the chance, they really do risk 
confirming the accusation that they are little more than Tory helpmates.  The 
alternative – the ‘half-way house’ represented by a confidence and supply 
arrangement – may seem superficially attractive.  However, as the party’s negotiators 
quite rightly argued in 2010, it may represent the worst rather than the best of both 
worlds, securing them just as much blame but far less power.7  All-in-all, then, it 
seems likely that, if Labour decides it wants or simply needs them, then the Lib Dems 
will come running, even if they feign a degree of reluctance in order to improve their 
bargaining position.  All this presumes, of course, that their cooperation is not being 
simultaneously sought by the Conservatives.  If the latter is the case, then, as in 2010, 
that position will once again be a very strong one.  We can only hope for their sakes 
that this time they play their cards better than they did in 2010. 
 
Depending on how many MPs they bring with them to Westminster, Miliband and 
Clegg (or whoever replaces him as leader, either at Labour’s insistence or that of his 
own disillusioned supporters) may not be able to put together a majority coalition, 
meaning they will then have to consider whether to govern as a minority coalition 
(such things are by no means unknown inEuropean countries like Denmark, Sweden 
and Norway) or to invite in one or more parties to get them ‘over the line’ (generally 
reckoned to be somewhere around 320 seats).  Depending on how short of this figure 
they fall, and depending on how well the other, mainly regional/national parties 
perform, this could mean making an offer to the Scottish Nationalists (the SNP), 
Plaid and/or one or more of the Northern Irish parties.  It may also see an offer made 
to the solitary Green MP, Caroline Lucas, assuming that she manages to hang on to 
her seat in Brighton Pavilion. 
 
Again, all would then face a choice between those parties actually joining the 
government as full-blown coalition partners or acting as ‘support parties’ by 
providing votes when they are needed for confidence motions, budgets and other 
legislation, either on an ad hoc or a contractual basis.  The SNP has already declared 
that it would consider the latter, even declaring in mid-December 2014 that it might 
break its own moratorium on its Westminster contingent voting on English-only 
legislation.  Whether it would actually demand entry into a UK government – and 
whether Labour would be in the least bit interested in granting it – is another matter.  
It seems unlikely on both sides, but never say never.  It is hard to believe Nicola 
Sturgeon (or would it be Alec Salmond?) sanctioning such a deal, but there may be 
some Labour people who can see the attraction of having the auld enemy inside the 
tent rather than the other way round.  After all, to employ the rational choice idiom 
often employed by those comparativists who analyse government formation, 
whatever its other advantages, coalition, even though it requires time and effort to 
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manage, almost certainly lowers the inevitable transaction costs that come with 
dealing on a day-to-day basis with other political parties. 
 
Irrespective of the nature of the deals that Labour may or may not be able to do with 
other parties, they will to some extent be determined not just by the numbers but by 
the correspondence between its policies and those laid out by its potential allies 
during the election campaign.  There will be plenty of earnest attempts between now 
and the election by journalists to get the parties to reveal which bits of their 
manifestos are non-negotiable and which positions are ‘red lines.’  Unless we are very 
much mistaken – and unless British politicians are very much more stupid than their 
continental counterparts – these efforts will be largely futile.  It makes absolutely no 
sense for any of the parties, if they can possibly avoid doing so, to reveal their hands 
before they get into the poker game of government formation talks.  So they do in the 
rest of Europe, they will only rule out cooperation with parties that are clearly 
anathema (which for Labour would presumably include the Conservatives and, 
almost certainly, UKIP) and then brush off questions about other parties with 
dreadfully familiar platitudes: ‘It’s for the voters to decide’, ‘I’m not going to get into 
to discussing hypotheticals’, etc., etc. 
 
That does not of course mean that Labour will not be thinking about what it will and 
won’t be prepared to insist and compromise upon.  Inasmuch as the phrase ‘Lib Dem 
policies’ means anything these days, there remains a considerable degree of overlap 
between the two parties’ programmes.   And their willingness to work together to 
make changes to (although not scrap) the bedroom tax from 2014 onwards, 
notwithstanding the fact that Labour initially criticized Clegg’s volte face on the issue 
as ‘unbelievable hypocrisy’, is clutched at as a straw in the wind by those who believe 
an arrangement is possible – even after the dismissive private briefings and public 
sneers directed at Miliband during the Lib Dems’ last conference before the election.  
According to Labour insiders, however, coalition with the Lib Dems is not an option 
that anyone in the Leader’s Office or the Shadow Cabinet can be seen to be seriously 
discussing.   If there is a group at the very top working out the details of Labour’s 
negotiating stance – something that would surely be sensible, given the party’s lack 
of preparedness in 2010 – then it is operating under very deep cover indeed.8   If that 
is the case, it would be entirely understandable, not so much because the Lib Dems 
are electorally toxic or because imagining a deal with them would incur the wrath of 
trade union leaders like McCluskey, but because the very existence of such a group 
would risk shattering the illusion that Labour is gunning for an overall majority – an 
illusion still deemed to be important in order to maintain the morale of activists.    
 
Majority Coalition 
 
But let us say for the purposes of argument that the option to form a majority 
coalition with the (remaining) Lib Dems was open to Labour. Should Labour seize 
the opportunity? We would argue yes. For it is clear from the experience of the 
current Conservative-Lib Dem coalition that, contrary to the bleating of disappointed 
Conservative supporters and MPs, forming a coalition with the Lib Dems has been a 
boon to the Conservative party. On the whole the Coalition has been dominated by 
the policies and decisions of the larger party. Certainly, the Tories were defeated on 
at least one major policy—boundary change—but on almost every other front (the 
economy, the NHS, the EU) it is Conservative policy that has won the day.  
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Most obviously, a majority coalition has secured to David Cameron a comfortable 
majority in the Commons, and a working one in the Lords. That has provided 
stability, and the numbers to push through some very significant reforms to the 
British state. Whatever one makes of the health reforms led by the then Health 
Secretary Andrew Lansley, it is worth bearing in mind that these are reforms that 
would not have quickly or easily passed under a Conservative government with a 
single party majority.  Recall that the Health and Social Care Act 2012 was an 
enormous act, passed under pressure at the end of a parliamentary session that was 
already twice as long in order to push through a high number of bills; and that bills 
must pass through both the Commons and the Lords. Under the Labour 
governments of 1997-2010, the Lib Dems had become the crucial swing party in the 
Lords—without the Lib Dems on their side, then, the Conservatives may really have 
struggled to pass the Act, even in its revised form.9 
 
Moreover, for good or ill, Tory ministers have been the public face, and drivers of, of 
these policies. The vast majority of the key Whitehall departments are fronted by 
Conservative ministers, not Lib Dems.  It is with these individuals that the public 
identifies most policies, the supreme irony being that the one policy to which the Lib 
Dems had, initially, definitely not agreed—tuition fees—was the province of a 
department headed by a Lib Dem Secretary of State! Controlling most of the 
departments meant that the Conservatives have been in control, for the most part, 
not just over policy but also over the day-to-day business of government.  
 
For the Lib Dems the scoreboard is in the negative. They have struggled to have an 
impact in the coalition partly because of inexperience in government, but also 
because of some poor initial decisions. They took only a few ministerial posts, but 
they failed to take charge of any great offices of state. Junior ministers have had 
some influence in their departments, but this has been highly variable, and depends 
a great deal on their Conservative Secretary of State, and the nature of the 
department.  True, the Lib Dems have had some important successes with the pupil 
premium, same sex marriage, and raising the tax threshold; and in some cases they 
have delayed or effectively vetoed Tory policies (the so-called British Bill of Rights, 
for instance).  However, many of these successes have been relatively small and, 
where Lib Dem policies have been implemented, that implementation has often 
occurred in an incremental way – in marked contrast to Conservative policies which 
are usually broader and potentially more far reaching (a speedier austerity 
programme, welfare reform, the NHS). Where the Lib Dems have delayed or vetoed 
Tory policies it has either been done behind the scenes or the news has been so 
fleeting that often it has passed the public by.  More than this, the successes the Lib 
Dems have had have been overshadowed by failures and turnarounds. The signature 
policy of the Lib Dems—constitutional change (AV, Lords reform)—has mostly failed. 
On austerity and cutbacks, the Lib Dems agreed to (rightly or wrongly) a much 
quicker schedule than they promised prior to the 2010 election. And, then, of course, 
there was tuition fees.  
 
Where there has been conflict in the Conservative-Lib Dem Coalition, it is just as 
likely to have been between ministers from the same party (No 10 and Theresa May, 
May and Gove) than between ministers from different coalition parties.  But, 
especially in the latter half of the parliament, this has not been through want of 
trying by the Lib Dems.  They have, after all, long since moved into differentiation 
(and in 2014, ‘decoupling’) mode—that is, seeking to distinguish themselves from the 
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Conservatives in government: for instance, DPM Clegg delivering a separate 
statement following the publication of the 2012 Leveson report on the need for a 
legislative solution to press regulation; or Vince Cable insisting in 2014 that the 
Office for Budget Responsibility spell out the differences between the Conservative 
and Lib Dem approaches to future spending cuts.  
  
But it is not clear that the public believes the Lib Dems, forgives them—or cares. 
Differentiation is a sensible strategy, but it is confusing to the public who see the Lib 
Dems still in government and voting on government policies that are seen (rightly or 
wrongly) as Conservative in foundation. Even now (in late 2014) Clegg is asked how 
he can be ‘propping up the Coalition’.10 The Lib Dems may have proved they can be a 
party of government, and it is remarkable that the party has maintained its internal 
cohesion under such pressure (of course, the same cannot be said of those who voted 
for the Lib Dems in 2010). But this has been at the cost of popularity, with polling 
putting the Lib Dems in single digit percentages. This is a long way from the 23% of 
the vote that they secured following the 2010 general election. This is a fundamental 
problem for smaller parties in coalitions: they struggle to gain the attention of the 
public; and they are rarely rewarded at a second election. Truly, the coalition has 
turned into a ‘miserable little compromise’ for the Lib Dems.11 
 
So we scratch our heads about those in Labour who look down upon a coalition as a 
poor alternative to minority government. As Matthew D’Ancona has said, it is no 
longer possible to argue, as many argued prior to the 2010 election, that coalition 
government is unworkable. 12  Coalition means compromise, but the cost of 
compromise is negligible compared to the benefits of being in power.  Of course, we 
should say history doesn’t necessarily repeat itself. In 2015, Labour will be faced with 
at least one potential partner who has more immediate coalition experience than 
Labour: the Lib Dems will have the experience of five years of coalition behind them, 
while the SNP may be able to draw on the direct experience of Alex Salmond. More 
generally, we can presume that all potential coalition partners will have learned from 
the experience of the Lib Dems and act accordingly—for instance, they may present 
Labour with a tougher bargain (more strategically chosen ministerial portfolios, for 
instance); they may be more targeted in their differentiation strategy; they may 
demand greater freedom to disagree in government.13  
 
But overall, coalition remains the better alternative for Labour, for two key reasons. 
It means a majority in the Commons (but not necessarily the Lords); and because in 
practice the impact of the smaller party is limited—limited in government, and 
limited from the public’s point of view. 
 
Labour can learn other lessons from the current coalition. Four seem particularly 
apposite: 
 
First, Labour (and its partner or partners in coalition) time in negotiations. As 
both coalition parties learned to their regret, marry in haste and you repent at 
leisure. Labour should take some time following the election to think about 
priorities—or even just to rest.  
 
Second, Labour will have to work at a coalition, just like any relationship. A 
good rule of thumb in dealing with the other party or parties in a coalition is 
‘good faith and no surprises’—even if this does not always happen in practice. 
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It means setting up mechanisms similar to that of the Conservative-Lib Dem 
Coalition—the quad, additional special advisers for the smaller party, and so 
on. Labour can kill with kindness: most of these mechanisms will not help the 
smaller party or parties with voter popularity, but they will help with day-to-
day coalition relations.  
 
Third, it is not inter-party dissent that characterises coalitions (as much as 
journalists think it does) but rather intra-party dissent. Philip Cowley and 
Mark Stuart have chronicled the rebelliousness of this government. Much of 
this is due to the characteristic fractiousness of the Tory party, but being in a 
coalition has added to the ranks of the dissatisfied and the disgruntled. Shorn 
of the opportunity to rise in the ranks, and soured by David Cameron’s relative 
popularity, Tory MPs in particular have rebelled at an extraordinarily high 
rate—and of course, two have left the party. So Labour needs to think about 
how it is going to manage backbenchers over a five year term. Certainly it has 
to avoid getting into the same situation as the Conservatives, many of whose 
supporters seem unable or unwilling to see that their party has got far more 
from the Lib Dems than the Lib Dems have ever got out of them.    
 
Fourth, relationships evolve. By the mid-term there will be pressure from 
various arenas for a renewal—of policy, staff and approach. The Conservative-
Lib Dem Coalition gave us the rapidly-forgotten ‘Mid Term Review’; and later 
a modest (and equally unmemorable) reshuffle. A coalition under Labour 
would need to do better. And then there is the end game: Labour will need to 
manage the ‘decoupling’ strategy of the other party (or parties).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Following a hung parliament, then, Labour, presuming for the sake of argument that 
it emerges as the largest party after the general election, has a number of options: 
single minority government, coalition minority government, coalition majority 
government or single party majority government. Obviously, to some extent these 
options will be determined by the parliamentary arithmetic. But we strongly suggest 
that those advocating minority government (in some form or other) over coalition 
government are sorely mistaken: the ability to form a minority government is by no 
means a given, nor are the precedents (at least in the UK) particularly encouraging. 
As a result, majority coalition government—for the larger parties at least—is clearly 
the next best thing to an overall majority if the latter, as is likely, proves to be beyond 
Labour’s capacity.  
 
If the experience of the current coalition is anything to go by, coalition government is 
far, far more beneficial to the larger party. It gets the benefit of a working majority in 
the Common and (ideally) a relative majority in the Lords. Most of its policies and 
decisions, therefore, are likely to be agreed to. It does not need to worry so much 
about ‘distinctiveness’—that is primarily a task for the smaller party in the coalition. 
The smaller party (or parties, as the case may be) struggles to gain traction with the 
public. It may not get its policies implemented, in which case it is accused of being 
ineffective. Even where it does get its policies implemented this may happen in very 
diluted fashion—or worse still, the larger party takes credit or is given credit by the 
public. More than this, the smaller party is constantly caught between a rock and a 
hard place: vetoing or watering down the policies of the larger party and inviting 
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criticism that they are the tail wagging the dog, or else of agreeing too readily to the 
wishes of the larger party and be accused of ‘rolling over’. And while the incumbency 
effect applies to both government parties, the evidence suggests that it is the smaller 
party who suffers more.14 So the larger party wins twice: it has relatively stable 
government, and it gets to watch a rival party twist in the wind of public opinion. For 
Labour in 2015, just as it was for the Conservatives in 2010, a majority coalition, if it 
is achievable, may feel like second-best, but it is nevertheless a no-brainer. 
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